In the domain of power generation and management the vastness of new technological solutions, often driven by environmental regulations, poses new challenges in ships’ design and management, where the need for integration of diverse energy converters (ICEs, batteries, fuel cells, wind, capacitors, etc.) confront designers and operators with systems based on profoundly different operating principles coming together with different requirements and control and digital systems. Integration for harnessing the full potential in a safe and secure frame is key to their implementation.

Furthermore, the capability of integrating different systems (and their dynamics) involve an always increased number of sensors, whose data, fused, should become available for optimisation and increased awareness during normal and safe critical operations.

Comprehensive HAZOP (Hazard Operability) studies are essential for such vessels, yet the methodologies are poorly established within the waterborne sector whilst other sectors operating safety critical digital systems (aerospace, nuclear, medical automotive etc.) have well established practices. Furthermore, applying “hardware in the loop” to simulation and validation of digital systems in dependent on the quality of the digital simulation model. This can be difficult for waterborne transport due to the variability of ship designs, complexity and lack of relevant data concerning the integrated components. Pre-delivery testing and sea trials could include fault simulation and digital testing founded upon the identification of critical digital systems identified by the HAZOP, yet such trials focus on hard-ware or subsystems such as rudder control rather than addressing the entire integration. For safety critical systems, reliability regimes need to be established to identify the safe default state in case of system failure or the identification of malicious intervention. In this respect the best system state could be: “fail operational”, “fail soft”, “fail safe”, “fail secure”, “fail passive”, “be fault tolerant”.

Activities will address the development of a HAZOP methodology for whole system assessment of highly digitised, connected complex vessels. The methodology should include system, system of systems designed for specific function or sets of functions and/or a methodology for the entire vessel, including when application of artificial intelligence algorithms is foreseen. The methodology will be developed with relevant stakeholders including shipbuilders, system designers and equipment providers, IT professionals, operators, class societies, regulators. The acceptability of the methodology to all stakeholders will be assessed and an implementation roadmap will be developed to account for any identified barriers. Work will draw upon the expertise of other sectors with more developed procedures for the assessment and assurance of digital safety.

On-board systems and functions integration by design, for safe and secure operation should be used to test and demonstrate the safety and security of the applications.

The developed methodology will be applied to a representative complex highly digitised vessel, safety critical systems and functions will be identified, and appropriate reliability regimes and mitigation measures will be established with consideration of both malicious intervention and system failure.

Cost effective methodologies for validating the safety, resilience and correct functioning of digital and connected safety critical ship systems, including system of systems, will be developed and demonstrated.

• In case of validation on the basis of a theoretical digital models and/or digital twinning (e.g. hardware in the loop) then the validity of the model should be proven as well as its flexibility to be applied towards a range of vessel designs.
• In case of validation on the basis of physical testing of the responses of the final system to a range of fault conditions and malicious interventions during the final trials, there should be assurance that test conditions are representative of the identified risks.

Guidance should be produced and disseminated concerning the recommended methodology for assuring the safety and resilience of complex digitalised and connected shipping.

The safety assessment should be developed by using methodologies suitable for being assessed in international fora such as the International Maritime Organisation.